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Mainstreaming	environmental,	social	and	corporate
governance
Businesses	in	today’s	marketplace,	in	both	the	financial	and	non-financial	sectors,	have	to	pay	attention	to	the
environmental	and	social	impact	of	what	they	do,	as	well	as	to	respect	high	standards	of	corporate	governance.
The	group	of	standards	is	commonly	referred	to	as	‘ESG’.	ESG	is	now	a	mainstream	activity.	President	Trump
resists.	He	is	mistaken	(again).
I	see	a	need	to	improve	the	authentication,	oversight	and	scrutiny	of	ESG	claims,	ratings	and	indexing.	Despite	the
efforts	of	bodies	such	as	the	SASB	(Sustainability	Accounting	Standards	Board)	and	the	Principles	for	Responsible
Investment	body	(PRI)	supported	by	the	UN,	there	are	conflicts	of	interest	that	produce	a	lack	of	rigour	and
consistency.	The	labels	are	scattered	around	like	sprinkles	on	a	tray	of	cupcakes.
The	setting
On	30	May	2019,	the	Washington	Post	ran	a	story	on	how	Salesforce,	a	dominant	provider	in	the	US	of	software	for
businesses	in	managing	their	customers	and	orders,	had	decided	to	cease	to	provide	their	software	to	a	client
company	that	sold	semi-automatic	guns	to	members	of	the	public.	Apparently,	the	sales	were	seen	to	violate
Salesforces’	standards	and	policies	on	what	constituted	a	socially	‘acceptable	use’	of	their	software	platform.
On	1	July	2019,	the	BBC	reported	that	Swiss-based	insurer	Chubb	is	to	cut	its	exposure	to	the	coal	industry.	It
announced	it	would	no	longer	underwrite	the	building	and	operation	of	new	coal-fired	plants	or	new	risks	for
companies	that	generate	more	than	30	per	cent	of	their	revenues	from	coal	mining.	According	to	the	BBC,	Allianz,
Hannover	&	Lloyds	banking	Group	have	also	scaled	back	on	their	exposure	to	coal	mining.
In	the	UK,	the	financial	regulator,	the	FCA,	has	been	moving	to	ensure	that	pension	funds,	insurers	and	other	asset
managers	have	independent	governance	committees	to	try	to	ensure	consistency	between	the	fiduciary	duties	of
asset	managers	to	clients	and	the	widening	of	their	investment	remits	to	take	account	of	ESG	concerns.	What	is
common	to	each	of	these	developments	is	the	mainstreaming	of	ESG	considerations.
The	conflict	of	private	and	public	interest
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Some	market	theorists	view	the	mainstreaming	of	ESG	as	a	negative	development.	According	to	the	classic	model
of	the	firm,	a	business	enterprise	comes	together	because	it	can	bring	within	itself	activities	that	it	can	perform	more
cheaply	and	effectively	through	internalisation,	rather	than	by	sourcing	them	from	others	in	the	market.	What	is
important	in	this	model	is	the	sharp	distinction	between	costs	that	are	internal	and	incurred	within	the	enterprise	and
costs	that	are	external.	It	seems	to	imply	that	those	costs	that	can	be	externalised	should	be.	Otherwise,	earnings
are	not	being	maximised	and	the	market	capitalisation	of	a	firm	based	on	future	projected	earnings	will	be
impaired.	Such	market	theorists	argue	that	a	firm’s	management	is	not	acting	in	the	best	interest	of	investors	and
shareholders	by	blurring	the	lines	between	internal	and	external	costs.
According	to	this	kind	of	distinction,	when	the	costs	of	polluting	mainly	fall	outside	the	firm,	they	are	of	no	concern	to
the	firm	itself.	Similarly	a	shoe	or	clothing	brand	and	marketing	company	should	have	no	concern	about	working
conditions	in	the	supply	chain,	and	equally	an	online	platform	provider	should	have	no	concern	about	the	uses	that
might	be	made	of	the	platform,	and	a	pharmaceutical	company	should	have	no	concern	about	the	use	of	its
products	in	the	growth	of	addictions.
This	interpretation	of	the	model	of	a	firm	immediately	suggests	a	potential	conflict	of	interest	between	corporate
objectives	and	the	wider	public	interest,	and	a	challenge	for	investment	fiduciaries	who	have	an	obligation	to
consider	the	best	interests	of	their	clients.
It	is	this	potential	conflict	that	provides	the	context	for	the	Executive	Order	(EO)	issued	by	Trump’s	White	House	in
April	2019	on	‘Promoting	Energy	Infrastructure’.	The	EO	requires	the	Department	of	Labor	to	review	the	investment
of	retirement	plans	in	the	energy	sector	so	as	to	ensure	that	they	meet	their	fiduciary	duties	to	maximise
shareholder	returns	over	the	long	term.	It	is	an	effort	to	keep	ESG	concerns	at	arm’s	length	and	to	protect	fossil
fuels.
Filling	the	gap
We	can	think	of	this	potential	conflict	of	interest	in	terms	of	a	‘gap’	or	a	‘wedge’	between	the	incentives	operating
with	the	managers	of	a	firm	and	the	societal	interest.	ESG	has	become	‘mainstream’	because	a	restricted
interpretation	of	what	is	of	concern	to	a	firm	and	to	its	managers	and	what	is	not,	based	on	what	is	internal	and
what	is	external,	is	no	longer	accepted.	ESG	closes	or	reduces	the	gap	or	wedge	between	the	incentives	for	the
managers	of	the	firm	and	the	wider	societal	interest.	The	drivers	of	this	change	are	both	outside	the	firm	and	within
the	firm.
External	drivers	of	ESG
The	drivers	of	change	outside	the	firm	are	often	advocacy	groups.	They	take	the	familiar	form	of	environmental
NGOs,	or	those	concerned	with	employment	conditions	in	supply	chains,	or	those	concerned	with	the	implications
of	internet	platforms	for	online	misuse.	It	seems	likely	that	they	will	increasingly	revert	to	litigation	to	try	to	get	their
way.	Litigants	point	to	a	general	‘duty	of	care’	incumbent	on	the	boards	and	managers	of	companies	to	observe
ESG	criteria,	and	also	to	specific	harms	such	as	in	the	case	of	the	opioid	litigation	ongoing	in	the	United	States.
Despite	the	fact	that	NGOs	have	notoriously	poor	standards	of	governance	themselves,	the	stakes	for	the	corporate
world	in	terms	of	reputation	and	profits	are	high.	In	addition,	investors	have	their	own	increasing	concerns.	They
may	not	want	to	invest	in	companies	making	or	selling	arms,	alcohol	or	tobacco	products,	or	mining	coal.	So-called
‘sin’	stocks	may	perform	well	in	the	short	term.	But	from	an	investor	perspective,	investments	in	companies	with
environmentally	or	socially	‘harmful’	activities	may	leave	them	with	exposure	to	companies	with	stranded	assets,
facing	higher	regulatory	risks	or	declining	sales.
Investors	also	look	to	positives.	They	apply	filters.	They	want	to	select	investments	in	companies	with	good
standards	of	corporate	governance,	good	employment	practices,	who	take	account	of	the	environment	in	what	they
do,	and	that	deal	honestly	and	fairly	with	the	consumer.
Internal	drivers	of	change
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There	are	also	internal	incentives	for	managers.	Some	evidence	suggests	that	at	least	part	of	the	ESG	agenda	has
a	direct	and	positive	implication	for	corporate	performance.	Companies	that	have	high	standards	of	corporate
governance,		for	example,	that	separate	the	role	of	chairman	from	that	of	CEO,	that	embrace	gender	and	ethnic
diversity	at	senior	corporate	levels,	including	in	the	boardroom,	may	outperform	their	rivals.
More	generally,	some	comparisons	between	market	performance	of	stocks	in	a	general	index,	compared	with
stocks	weighted	according	to	ESG	criteria,	suggest	better	performance	by	ESG	stocks.	In	addition,	there	are
management	incentives	around	the	market	valuation	of	companies.	There	is	empirical	evidence	that	if	a	company	is
included	in	a	market	benchmark	or	index	used	by	investors	and	investment	managers,	such	as	the	S&P	500,	then
the	its	cost	of	capital	is	reduced	relative	to	those	outside	the	index.	The	same	applies	to	the	inclusion	of	a	firm	in	an
ESG	benchmark	or	index.	There	is	thus	an	incentive	to	be	included	in	ESG	benchmarks.	There	is	a	penalty	to	being
dropped.
What	this	means	is	that	the	incentive	structure	for	managers	has	changed.	There	are	costs	to	ignoring	societal	and
investor	concerns.	There	are	gains	from	paying	attention	to	a	wider	set	of	performance	signals.	Both	external	and
internal	drivers	help	close	the	gap	or	wedge	between	the	private	interest	and	the	public.	President	Trump’s	EO	that
tries	to	solidify	the	gap	is	doomed	to	failure.
Measurement	and	authentication
The	mainstreaming	of	corporate	activities	around	ESG	raises	the	question	of	how	much	of	what	is	going	on	is	‘real’
and	how	much	is	window	dressing	and	sprinkles	on	the	cupcake.	In	a	speech	earlier	this	year,	the	chair	of	the
International	Accounting	Standards	Board	(IASB)	referred	to	the	huge	array	of	ESG	measures	being	deployed.	This
is	where	the	authentication	of	ESG	claims	in	benchmarking	and	indexing	becomes	crucial.
There	are	three	main	questions	around	authentication:
the	validity	and	transparency	of	what	exactly	is	being	measured	and	how	it	is	being	used;
the	consistency	of	measurement	between	firms	and	between	ratings;	and
who	is	doing	the	measurement.
What	is	being	measured	is	important	because	it	addresses	concerns	about	window	dressing	and	potentially
misleading	marketing	and	labelling.	Consistency	of	measurement	is	important	because,	in	its	absence,	inter-firm
comparisons	become	invalid	and	financial	indexes	grouping	different	firms	together,	or	differentiating	between
groups	according	to	ESG	classifications,	also	become	suspect.	Who	is	doing	the	measurement	is	important
because	it	affects	confidence	in	the	validity	of	ESG	benchmarks	and	their	uses.
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These	concerns	mean	that	a	lot	rides	on	who	exactly	is	doing	the	authentication	of	ESG	claims	and	labelling.	As
with	any	other	form	of	market	relationship,	questions	about	potential	conflicts	of	interest	become	of	paramount
importance.
The	different	sources	of	ESG	labelling	in	the	market	place
Self
authentication
A	firm	makes	known	to	its	shareholders	and	the
public	what	standards	it	follows	and	how	it
measures	up	to	them.
The	conflict	of	interest	in	this	case	is	with	their
self-interest	in	image	laundering.	We	are	all
familiar	with	companies	that	change	their	name,
or	brand	image,	in	order	to	present	a	different
face	to	the	world	and	different	gloss	on	their
activities	while	nothing	much	changes	in	the	core
of	what	they	are	actually	doing.
Advocacy
groups
Advocacy	groups	can	be	an	important	source	for
authenticating	ESG	claims.	We	are	also	all
familiar	with	various	types	of	labelling	that	certify
‘fairness’	or	‘sustainability’	in	sourcing.
The	difficulty	is	to	know	their	own	governance
standards.	In	addition,	the	relationship	with	the
firm	being	benchmarked	may	not	always	be	clear.
There	is	a	risk	of	mutual	backscratching.	SASB
has	a	governance	structure	that	aims	to	avoid
this	kind	of	problem.
Fund
promoters
There	is	a	growing	number	of	investment	funds
available	to	investors	with	ESG	concerns	and
aims.	The	promoters	of	these	funds	have	an
obvious	self-interest	in	providing	ESG
assurances.
The	difficulty	is	to	know	what	standards	have
been	observed	and	how	comparable	they	are
across	different	funds.	Fund	promoters	also	have
a	need	to	avoid	funds	that	are	too	narrowly
constructed	in	order	to	meet	regulatory
requirements	about	composition.	This	too	may
have	an	impact	on	selection	criteria.
Investment
managers
Investment	managers	also	face	a	conflict
between	the	costs	of	bringing	ESG	scrutiny	‘in-
house’	versus	relying	on	the	uncertain	standards
of	out-of-house	benchmark	providers.	It	is	not
always	clear	what	standards	they	use	or	how
they	use	them.	They	may	use	ESG	criteria	as
filters	about	what	goes	into	their	funds,	or	to
change	the	weightings	in	their	funds,	or	simply
as	talking	points	in	evaluating	stocks.
Investment	managers	increasingly	want	to	have
their	cupcake	and	eat	it	too.	They	market	"ESG"
funds	that	purport	to	have	the	same	or	better
performance	than	non-ESG	funds.	From	a
classical	portfolio	theory	perspective	this	is	a
dubious	claim,	as	a	portfolio	with	constraints	can
at	best	perform	as	well	as	a	portfolio	without
constraints,	assuming	the	portfolio	without
constraints	operates	on	the	efficient	frontier.
Index
compilers
Financial	sector	companies	that	compile	and
track	indexes	that	observe	ESG	ratings	also	are
a	source	for	benchmarking.	In	theory	they	can
provide	inter-firm	consistency.	In	practice	there
is	a	lack	of	consistency.
The	potential	conflict	of	interest	arises	in	part
because	of	their	interest	in	promoting	the	number
and	coverage	of	such	indexes.	In	addition,	there
are	questions	around	how	they	are	getting
compensated	and	how	far	it	is	by	the	companies
that	are	being	rated,	or	the	investment	managers
that	use	their	services.
Independent
ratings
agencies
Finally	there	are	independent	ratings	agencies
that	offer	ESG	benchmarks	and	ratings.	They
are	neither	index	constructors	or	fund	promoters
or	managers	or	advocates	but	exist	simply	to
meet	a	market	need	for	certification.They	too
can	offer	inter-firm	consistency	in	their	labelling.
The	difficulty	is	that	they	are	working	in	a	novel
field,	where	standards	and	analytic	techniques
are	not	yet	established.	Grabbing	market	share
may	be	important.	There	are	different	measures
for	judging	what	ESG	factors	are	material	to	the
analysis	of	risks	and	returns.	The	same	questions
around	potential	conflicts	of	interest	arise	in
connection	with	who	is	providing	their
compensation.
Oversight
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The	need	to	recognise	the	broader	definition	of	what	is	of	concern	to	a	company,	its	managers	and	shareholders	is
here	to	stay	as	a	permanent	feature	of	the	marketplace.	ESG	reporting	is	encouraged	by	international	bodies	such
as	the	UN-supported	PRI,	IOSCO	&	the	IFC	(a	World	Bank	affiliate).	In	the	EU,	the	Shareholders	Rights	Directive
that	comes	into	force	this	year	recommends	that	director	performance	be	reviewed	including	ESG	factors.	As	a
consequence,	questions	around	the	authentication	of	ESG	labelling	have	become	pressing.
In	the	2008	financial	crisis,	ratings	agencies	took	a	share	of	the	blame.	They	provided	reassuring	ratings	for
financial	products	for	investors,	notably	in	the	mortgage	market,	that	were	in	fact	high	risk.
The	lessons	drawn	by	regulators	were	that	ratings	agencies	required	oversight,	their	standards	of	measurement
needed	to	be	fully	transparent	and	open	to	inspection,	and	safeguards	needed	to	be	in	place	that	protected	against
potential	conflicts	of	interest	between	providers	of	ratings	and	the	subjects	of	rating.
ESG	ratings	and	benchmarks	are	not	yet	used	in	ways	that	suggest	that	false	measurement	presents	a	systemic
risk	to	the	market	in	ways	that	false	AAA	claims	did.	There	is	much	to	be	said	for	allowing	a	market	discovery
process	to	take	place	in	order	to	improve	ESG	claims.	However,	we	still	need	to	be	concerned	about	the
authenticity	of	ESG	claims.
​ESG	ratings	and	indexes	are	a	fast-growing	sector	of	financial	markets.	Unreliable	ESG	ratings	impair	investor
decisions,	market	valuations,	inter-firm	and	inter-market	comparisons	and	risk	assessments.	Regulators	need	to
engage	in	much	more	active	oversight	of	compensation,	incentives	and	transparency	in	this	fast-growing	field.
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